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Abstract: Smith’s scholars have not made explicit the fact that the definition of “pleasure” 
that Adam Smith uses is different from that of his contemporary interlocutors and, in 
particular, from those used by the utilitarian theorists. Although, in affirming that the 
moral feeling is created through the taking into account of the judgement of another 
person, Smith reproduces the Kantian distinction between the idea of the self and that of 
the other - on the contrary, with regard to the theory of sensations, he breaks with Kant’s 
separation (for whom pleasure is a reflexive perception) (Kant 1978) and he does not 
distinguish between the image of pleasure and pleasure itself. This implies the break with 
the homo economicus definition of human action. 
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Resumen: Los estudiosos de Smith no han hecho explícito que la definición de “placer” 
que Smith usa es diferente de aquella que usan sus interlocutores contemporáneos y, en 
particular, de aquellas usadas por los teóricos utilitaristas. Al afirmar que en la 
construcción del sentimiento moral el hombre tiene en cuenta el juicio de otra persona, 
Smith reproduce la distinción Kantiana entre la idea del yo y la idea del otro, pero Smith 
rompe con esa separación Kantiana en el caso del placer (para Kant el placer es una 
percepción reflexiva mientras que Smith no distingue entre la imagen de placer y el placer 
mismo). Esto implica romper con la definición de acción humana en términos de homo 
economicus. 
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Utility as a “Alienating” Beauty 
Although Hume and Smith maintained a warm friendship from the 
very moment they met, probably in 17521, until the death of Hume, in 1776, 
they debated in an intense mutual criticism. In particular, Smith considered 
David Hume to be a defender of a kind of utilitarianism and Smith devoted 
himself to the construction of a full social theory whose basis confronted the 
foundations of the theories that supposed that men act seeking utility2. 
According to Smith, human action is not based in the love of a mental 
system, that is to say, a structure that their memory retains of longed for 
pleasures and pains feared. But Humean passions are, precisely, based in 
that structure: in the habit of the association of ideas, threatened by the 
survival desire and, in short, by death instinct. We are carried away 
irremediably by instinctive pleasure, but it is “the good” for men; instinctive 
pain, that we can neither avoid, is “the evil” for men. So, as Hume himself 
tells us, men are slave of their own passions.  
To Smith, men experience of the world does not consist in the 
attraction of an individual system of beauty even though we think that 
shapes that instinctively captivate us will provide us with a sensation of 
pleasure. Even cause and effect is a type of subtle beauty that impresses men 
strongly, the same as animal and vegetable kingdom beauty does, the great 
natural ecosystem in which every element seems to fit as a great puzzle and 
every specie suits in the niche for whom it seems to have been created3. That 
is to say, utility is like beauty, something similar to imitative arts (Smith 
1983) and of little importance to Smith’s moral theory4.  
Hume himself provided this conception of utility as a way of beauty. 
Probably, Smith adopted this idea from his philosophical theory. (For their 
different concepts of utility, see Long 1990, 12-39)5 Hume’s theory is based in 
                                                        
1 Even though, according to Dugald Stewart, it is not clear when their relation began (Smith 1980 
(Vol. II): EPS). 
2 We leave this clear because some authors, Haakonssen included, consider Hume’s theory as “non 
utilitarian”. And this is true if we describe utilitarianism in the restricted view of Philosophical 
Radicalism, but it cannot be doubted that Hume introduced the idea of utility as a central 
element of social sciences (Haakonssen 1981). For different interpretations of Hume’s intentions, 
see Dow, 2002. 
3 Berkeley in his Theory of vision and in Alciphron was a more earnest defender of this type of 
functionalist theory, in which all beauty depends on the subordination of the uses to the ends. In 
fact, in this period, this authors from “the analysis of riches” normally raised the mechanical 
efficiency principle to the category of beauty and talked about organic beauty, or adaptation of a 
shape to the environment, and about the mechanical beauty, the perfect adaptation of the shape 
to his end, use or utility (Marchán 1996, p. 50). 
4 Haakonssen and Vivenza freed Smith from the utilitarian label in moral and in his law theory 
(Haakonssen, p. 97-10; Vivenza 2001, p. 143). The problem of Smith utilitarianism has also been 
presented, amongst other works, in the book of Griswold 1999, p. 540, and Trincado 2003. 
5 Haakonssen calls “utility of the means” to Hume’s, confronted to Bentham’s “utility of the ends”. 
But he do not make explicit if Hume was aware of this distinction (Haakonssen, p. 41). Bentham`s 
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a collection of atomic beauties perceived only individually6, and based in the 
idea of spectator7. As beauty is defined as a taste or sensation, it can be 
concluded that it is no more than a shape that provides pleasure, and 
deformity pain. Apart from instinctive pain, that seeks survival, Hume’s 
notion of beauty is centred in the motives of habit and fashion. The idea of 
beauty is communicated through sympathy: for instance, an asymmetric 
figure is disagreeable because it conveys the ideas of fall, a kind of pain. In 
Hume’s theory, the simple contemplation of a beautiful object is agreeable, 
and virtue consists in the production of this beauty that we relate to the ego. 
The utility of an object pleases his owner because it suggests the pleasure 
and convenience it can produce, so the owner is proud of the relation of the 
object with himself. The spectator sympathises with this owner’s pride and 
with the pleasure he imagines that the object generates. This sympathy that 
the object produces in others generates in the proprietor an additional 
pleasure and esteem. This reflection is secondary to the original pleasure; 
but finally it becomes the more important recommendation of riches and 
the main reason for our desiring it or admiring it in others. (Hume 1964). As 
Schliesser (2009) comments, Smith appears to view human nature as a 
collection of human propensities, either bedrock parts of human nature or 
the (necessary) consequence of such bedrock human nature (original or 
derived propensities). For instance, the original propensity to feel with 
others’ makes us construct language and language makes us construct 
division of labour necessary consequence of the faculty of reason and 
speech.8  
In conclusion, utility is only an image that we chase in our mind. 
Smith makes it clear, adding a critical nuance. In the seeking of utility – or of 
riches - we do not value the pleasure or pain provided, but the reducing of 
an anxiety we put in the accurateness of that shape of beauty, in which we 
see the means adapting to the ends. The search of utility is, so, love of 
system, a love that creates temporal or fictitious illusion, but not pleasure. 
The conceited son of the poor that, to obtain the conveniences that he 
supposes the rich enjoys, courts his hateful enemies and lives in an endless 
intrigue, is not looking to the comfort of the agent, but to the surprise of the 
real spectator, admired by the grandiosity of the image (Smith 1976, 181-3). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
concept of pleasure is, by the way, a bit different from, and more rational than Hume’s, as shows 
his poem: “Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure/ Such marks in pleasures and in pains 
endure/ Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end./ If it be public, wide let them extend./ Such 
pains avoid, whichever be thy view/ If pains must come, let them extend to few” (Stark 1954, “The 
Psychology of Economic Man”, p. 435). For further concepts of utility, see Stigler 1950, 58: 4: pp. 
307-27; and 58: 5: 373-96, p. 392. 
6 But, it is true that the valuating mechanism of Hume’s ethics seems to imply an objectivity and 
ethical cognitivism (see Tasset 1999, pp. 74-86; Mackie 1980; or Norton 1982). 
7 Foucault’s interpretation of Las Meninas suggested the presence of man as an aesthetic subject – 
artist or spectator (Foucault 1970).  
8 For language, see (1974), Levy (1997); Otteson (2002a), Otteson (2002b) and Dascal (2006) 
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Smith, with his famous example of the watch that generates an anxiety of 
looking the “exact” hour one time and another, shows that the idea of utility 
is a mental hallucination (Smith 1976, 180). 
Finally, then men are not homo economicus9 as, with regard to 
pleasure, they do not make judgments as a maximization of their 
subjectively defined ends, but they accept reality with gratitude or they 
reciprocate with reality (in modern ethics, the concept of “homo 
reciprocans” has been forged to make a contrast with individual 
utilitarianism idea of action (Godelier 1999) and, besides, there is an 
emphasis made on intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation, see Frey 1992, 
Caruso 2012). According to Adam Smith, with regard to moral sentiments, 
we may reciprocate with an image of ourselves that represent what others' 
may expect from our actions10.  
 
Smith’s Concept of Pleasure 
As stated in Trincado (2006), if anticipation is to Hume the source of 
pleasure, to Smith men seek joy that does not need anticipation. “I have, 
however, a mortal aversion to all anticipations” (Smith 1987, 270)11. Smith 
defines pleasure as something near to gratitude, that is to say, a natural gift 
that is not necessary to bring forward, and can be felt in every human 
gesture, in every external or imaginary creation. This gratitude is felt in calm 
events, from which pleasure can begin, “for whatever is the cause of pleasure 
naturally excites our gratitude” (Smith 1980, 48). Happiness consists of and 
depends on tranquillity and enjoyment. A wise man will be in every situation 
of his life equally calmed, joyful and satisfied. He is not blinded by frivolous 
pleasures and lives in the present. Our great evils come from not knowing 
the price of our own happiness, and wanting to change it for an illusory one 
(Smith 1976, 149). 
Pleasure is a way of contemplative gratitude, and “nothing is more 
graceful than habitual cheerfulness, which is always founded upon a peculiar 
relish for all the little pleasures, which common occurrences afford” (Smith 
1976, 41-2).. That is the case of the observation of the Statuary and Painting, 
in which we enjoy the pleasure of knowledge; or of the performers of 
                                                        
9 This term "economic man" was used by Bentham for the first time in the first nineteenth century 
when he describes action in maximization terms (Stark 1954, The Psychology of Economic Man, p. 
435). Afterwards, critics of John Stuart Mill (1836) stressed the idea. See Persky 1995 and Zabieglik 
2002. 
10 However, the economic man of the Wealth of nations does not contradict the ethical man of the 
TMS (Grampp 1948, Macfie 1967, and Macfie 1959). 
11 Letter 232 of Smith to William Strahan, Canongate, Edinburgh, 20 November 1783. 
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Dancing and Music, in which we enjoy the pleasure of movement (Smith 
1980, 176-207). “After the pleasures which arise from the gratification of the 
bodily appetites, there seem to be none more natural to man than Music and 
Dancing” (Smith 1980, 187). 
But pleasure for Smith is not corporal, neither mental. As is well 
known, Smith criticises the Epicurean system that considered the search for 
corporal pleasure and the avoidance of corporal pain – the body as a centre 
of sensations – as the only motive of action and the last and final objectives 
of natural desire and aversion. According to Epicurus, every mental pleasure 
or pain is derived from one of the body and from the self-preservation 
principle; but mental pleasures and pains are more acute than corporal 
pleasures. The body only experiments the present sensation, while the brain 
can also feel past and future sensations, the one through memory, the other 
through anticipation, and consequently suffers and enjoys more. When we 
are exposed to the greater physical pain, Epicurus said, we will always find, if 
we pay attention, that it is not the suffering of the present moment that 
basically torments us, but the recall of the past and the fear of the future. 
The present pain, alone and separated from what happened in the past or is 
bound to come in the future, is a trifle that does not deserve consideration. 
At the same time, when we enjoy the more intense pleasure, we will always 
find out that the physical sensation of the present moment is just a little 
fraction of our happiness and that our enjoyment emerges mainly from the 
evocation of the past or the bringing forward of the future (Smit 1976, 294-
300).  
Nevertheless, in Epicurus system, future uncertainty is painful; so the 
abstention of the seeking of pleasures let man live quiet, without fears, 
waiting the unavoidable death.  When body is free from pain and brain from 
every anxiety, the added sensation of physical pleasure is of little 
importance. Smith refutes this need of apathy and affirms that the wise man 
is sensible to whatever pleasure. Epicurus fails in the more customary 
mistake of science: excessive simplification (Smith 1976, 299.). All his theory 
is based in the seeking of prudential pleasure, not in the correction of active 
sensations. But there is a contradiction, because for Epicurus human action 
is passive. 
In this sense, for Smith we do not seek this mental tranquillity to 
freeing ourselves from uncertainty, another type of pain. That is what 
Epicureans affirmed, that agreed stoicism in the ethical ideal of apathy, that 
will reduce to the minimum the more acute pain, that of imagination, the 
anxiety of anticipation. But, for Smith, we seek tranquillity because only 
from that mood reality emerges and we are capable of having sensations (the 
contrary to “apathy”).  
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Besides, Epicurean pleasure based on self preservation cannot exist 
without pain: when pain oppresses us, his relief creates a comparative 
pleasure. But, Smith says, the first movement is not due to self-preservation, 
an ex post sensation of utility, but to a desire of instinctive movement that 
does not depend on past experiences.  
“Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate 
instincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, and the dread of 
pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without any 
consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great Director 
of nature intended to produce by them” (Smith 1976, 77-8).  
So, the hedonist idea of pleasure and pain, that sensations are 
supposed to produce, are ex post to movement, and this tendency to 
movement, in the other part, implies a preconception of the self and of 
distance – something contrary to Hume phenomenalism. 
“Those sensations appear to have been given us for the preservation of our own 
bodies... But the desire of changing our situation necessarily supposes some idea of 
externality; or of motion into a place different from that in which we actually are; 
end even the desire of remaining in the same place supposes some idea of at least 
the possibility of changing. Those sensations could not well have answered the 
intention of Nature, had they not thus instinctively suggested some vague notion 
of external existence” (Smith 1980, 167-8). 
Little by little, with the memory of the past man creates a system of 
usual pleasures and discriminates between external objects: it emerges the 
idea of beauty and, in particular, that of utility. But when he identifies 
himself with this system created by him, we can say that his own creature 
controls him and his identification with it uproots him. 
That is to say, man, after feeling the penetration of an ordered world, 
is grateful to it without demanding anything in change for it, and this is the 
first step necessary to feel the joy of living. Without this first gratitude, 
human feeling cannot begin12. As gratitude leads naturally to the search of 
correspondence and to receive, in return, gratitude, man reflects in his 
fellow beings and makes them subject of his gratitude. That is what men 
seek in their action: to feel themselves loved by their fellows and to be in 
consonance with others judgements. In addition, this is the moment when 
moral sentiment emerges, with the recognition of our equality with another 
being and his seeking to harmonise his feelings with our own.  
                                                        
12 Burke was grieved by those who, as had everything in live, they have nothing to feel the joy of 
living, as they do not allow Nature to continue its own process and even anticipate the desire and 
overcome enjoyment with pondered outlines and tricks of pleasure, so there is not interval or 
obstacle between desire and achievement (Burke 1909, p. 23). 
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Also, unlike the Stoics, for Smith, not only our sensibility to others 
feelings is compatible with self-command nature, but it is the very same 
principle on which it is based. The propriety of our feelings and sensations 
seems to be exactly in proportion to the force and vivacity with which we 
enter into and conceive the feelings and sensations of others. The individual 
that feels the more the joys and grieves of others is better endowed to obtain 
the fullest control of his own joys and grieves (Smith 1976, 152). 
Contrary to Hume’s argumentation, Smith says that the virtues and 
passions we acquire by habit are not so admired, because we find it difficult 
to enter into another person’s habit, as we have not acquired it by ourselves. 
In consequence, we approve of prudential self-command, in which a present 
object interests ourselves as much as a future one, but we do not admire it. 
The search of self-preservation is implicit in nature and, according to Smith, 
it is not a great achievement “supplying all the necessities and conveniences 
of the body, which are always very easily supplied” (Smith 1976, 213.). But 
prudence not addressed to the care for one-self is necessarily admirable 
(Smith 1976, 216.). Self-command allows us to address our passive feelings to 
the objective of Justice. Aiming to the accomplishment of virtue, it can 
control fear and rage; or the longing for comfort, pleasure or applause; and is 
“independent of the beauty, which it derives from its utility” (Smith 1976, 
238). So, when we observe someone controlling his fear to death addressed 
to a noble motive (as in Smith 1976, 238-9), the decreasing of his fear to 
death allows us to empathise with his noble search without being blocked by 
the sympathy with his pain. Thus, the self-command increases our 
admiration13.  
This idea of pleasure, obviously, challenges the idea of an homo 
oeconomicus rational calculator of pleasures and pains constructed in the 
nineteenth century (Persky 1995). 
 
Conclusion 
In brief, according to Smith, we act partly, it is true, to satisfy a mental 
system, although its main objective is to feel ourselves loved by our fellow 
feelings; but partly also we are guided by a moral reality when we do not 
listen to the applause of the real spectator, but to that of the impartial 
spectator. This provide us with the tranquillity of knowing that we are 
worthy of love, a peace of mind that allows grateful reality to emerge and 
that is a necessary condition for our capability to have feelings to “the 
                                                        
13 Besides, this is due to the fact that, according to Smith, and as Griswold points out, the fear to 
death is a pain of the imagination and, in consequence, is easier for us to sympathise with it than 
with a corporal pain (Griswold, p. 119). 
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other”. The search for utility is, as we have seen, a love of system that can 
create a temporal and fictitious illusion, but not pleasure; in short, is a 
mental hallucination that makes us sacrifice real happiness that we always 
have within our reach. The pleasure is gratitude, a gift of nature that do not 
needs to be foreseen, and that the very same anxiety of anticipation forbids. 
In fact, the first movement was not due to self-preservation, but to a desire 
of instinctive movement that does not depend on past experiences.  
Hume will say it, the man attracted unavoidably to pleasures and 
repelled by pains is slave of his own passions. So, Smith gave especial 
importance in his moral theory to self-command, based on a definition of 
freedom in positive terms. But self-command, according to Smith, does not 
provide – only – the avoidance of the “painful” uncertainty, but in it we find 
the propriety of actions: that is to say, it allows to pursuit truth and Justice 
or, what is more, gratitude to life.  
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